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Summary findings
The link between poverty and child labor has  Moreover, they find evidence of a gender gap in child
traditionally been regarded as well established. But  labor linked to poverty. Girls as a group (as well as
recent research has questioned the validity of this link,  across urban, rural, and poverty subsamples) are
claiming that poverty is not a main determinant of child  consistently found to be more likely to engage in harmful
labor.  child labor than boys. This gender gap may reflect
Starting from the premise that child labor is not  cultural norms (an issue that calls for further  research).
necessarily harmful, Blunch and Verner analyze the  The incidence of child labor increases with age,
determinants of harmful child labor, viewed as child  especially for girls.
labor that directly conflicts with children's accumulation  In Ghana there are structural differences-across
of human capital, in an effort to identify the most  gender, between rural and urban locations, and across
vulnerable groups. Identifying these groups might enable  poverty quintiles of households-in  the processes
policymakers to take appropriate  action.  underlying child labor.
The authors reinstate the positive relationship between
poverty and child labor.
This paper-a  joint product of Human Development 3, Africa Technical Families, and the Economic Policy Sector Unit,
Latin America and the Caribbean Region-is  part of a larger effort in the Bank to investigate and understand the processes
underlying child labor. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC
20433.  Please contact  Hazel  Vargas,  room  18-138,  telephone  202-473-7871,  fax  202-522-2119,  email  address
hvargas@worldbank.org. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at www.worldbank.org/research/
workingpapers. The authors may be contacted at nblunch@Rworldbank.org  or dverner@Rworldbank.org.  November 2000.
(21 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of  work in progress to encourage the exchange of  ideas about
development issues. An objective of the series  is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordinigly.  The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this
paper  are  entirely  those  of the authors.  They do not necessarily  represent  the view of the World  Bank,  its Executive  Directors,  or the
countries they represent.
Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination CenterRevisiting  the Link  Between  Poverty  and  Child  Labor:
The Ghanaian  Experience t
Niels-Hugo  Blunch
The George Washington University and World Bank
Dorte Verner
World Bank
t  We are grateful to Rosemary Bellew for invaluable support and Chris Blanchard, Peter Harrold, Janet
Leno, David  Ribar and participants at the  European  Society for Population Economics'  conference in
Bonn, June 2000 for helpful comments and suggestions.1.  Introduction
Sub-Saharan  Africa  has  long  been  stagnant  in  terms  of  economic  growth  and
development. Indeed, a recent study goes as far as to call it a "Growth Tragedy" (Easterly
and  Levine,  1997). In order to get out of this dead-lock, economic activity should be
stimulated.  However,  especially  when  it  comes  to  young  children,  there  exists  an
(intertemporal) trade-off: should the children work now, and thus instantly contribute to
household income or should they attend school, thus accumulating human capital, while
foregoing incomes in the meantime, eventually leading to  even higher incomes  in the
future?
Child  labor is  a widespread phenomenon. ILO (1993) estimates  that there  are
around 70.9 million "economically active" children aged  10-14, while UNICEF (1991)
estimates that 80 million children aged 10-14 undertake work, which is "interfering with
their  normal  development".  Disregarding  the different  methodologies  and  definitions
underlying various estimates, it should be stressed that the nature of child labor differs
widely across continents and regions.
In  developing  economies,  the  child  may  often  be  a  net  contributor  to  the
household, while in the industrialized economies he or she is not. The incidence of child
labor may be high in industrialized  economies but the children  either merely perform
small tasks  in the house  to assist their parents or work in order to finance their own
(above subsistence level) consumption. Thus, child labor need not necessarily be "bad",
nor warrant action from policy makers. Indeed, some (low, non-human capital inflicting)
levels of child labor may even stimulate the children in their personal development  as
well as generate a natural attachment to the labor market already at an early age. Thus,
child  labor can be beneficial, rather than harmful, as long as it is not undertaken at the
expense of educational attainment.
In  developing  economies  child  labor  is  often  performed  at  the  expense  of
education,  which  makes  it  an  important  issue  warranting  further  analysis.  The
intertemporal trade-off in the contribution of the child to the household and the choice
involved - should the household choose school or work on behalf of the child? - is the
topic of this paper, analyzing the case of Ghana.
2While  the Sub-Saharan region has been stagnating over the last decades, Ghana
has taken numerous steps to increase economic activity, following the economic break-
down in  1983. The Economic  Restructuring Program  (ERP), initiated in  1983 by the
Ghanaian  government in  collaboration  with the World Bank and  the  IMF, liberalizes
trade  and  encourages  industrial  invention  and  production.  However,  despite  these
undertakings,  which  also  include improving  primary  education  as well  as  legislative
steps'  to prevent  child  labor, child  labor is  still an  integral part  of recent  Ghanaian
economic  activity. Hence, there  seems to be a need  for analyzing in more  detail what
determines  the  outcome  of  the  household's  labor-work  decision  for  their  younger
members  in  Ghana,  specifically  in  order to  attempt  identifying  the  most  vulnerable
groups,  thus  possibly  enabling  appropriate  actions  to  be  taken  by  policy  makers.
Analyzing a new data set, this paper is such an attempt.
While the analysis of incidence and determinants of harmful 2 child labor in Ghana
leads to several interesting conclusions, the major conclusions emerging from this study
are:  (1)  we  reinstate  the  positive  relationship  between  poverty  and  child  labor,  a
conjecture that has been questioned by recent literature (2) we find evidence of a gender
gap in child labor linked to poverty, since girls as a group as well as across urban, rural
and poverty sub-samples consistently are found to be more likely to engage in harmful
child labor than boys, and (3) there exist structural differences in the processes underlying
harmful child labor in Ghana across gender, across rural/urban location as well as across
poverty quintile of the household.
The next  section reviews the previous literature, while section three presents  a
preliminary analysis of the incidence of child labor and schooling in Ghana. Section four
presents a simple economic model of the household decision on child labor and discusses
the econometric methodology. Section five presents the results from the analysis of child
labor determinants.  Section  six concludes with policy recommendations and  directions
for further research.
l E.g., The  Labor Decree  (1967),  which  prohibits  employment  of children  under  the age of 15.
2Defined  as child labor  that conflicts  with  human  capital  accumulation  of the child.
32.  Review  of Previous  Research  of Child  Labor  and Schooling
Previous research on child labor has focussed almost exclusively on empirical work. An
important  exception,  however, is Basu  and Van (1998). They develop  a model  of an
economy  in  which  child  labor  is  a  potentially  important  component.  The  economy
exhibits multiple  equilibria.  Whether child  labor exists in equilibrium depends on  the
general level of productivity of the economy. If the economy is very unproductive, child
labor exists in equilibrium, while if very productive, it does not. Two assumptions are
identified as essential to this result. First, their "Luxury Axiom" states that the children
are sent to work only if the household's  income from other sources than  child labor is
very low. Secondly, their "Substitution Axiom",  assumes that - from the viewpoint  of
firms - child labor is a substitute for adult labor.
While  these  two  crucial  assumptions  are  related  to  the  micro-behavior  of
households  and  firms,  Swinnerton  and  Rogers (1999) show that  in  addition to  these
micro-level  assumptions there  also exists an essential assumption linked to the macro-
behavior. They term this the "Distribution Axiom", which states that income or wealth
from non-labor sources must be sufficiently concentrated within only a few of the agents.
In particular, Swinnerton and Rogers show that with sufficient equality in the distribution
of non-labor income, a market equilibrium with child labor cannot exist in the Basu and
Van model. This view is now increasingly held by international organizations,  e.g., the
World Bank (see Fallon and Tzannatos, 1998). While, thus, some progress has been made
in establishing important  characteristics and determinants of child  labor in developing
economies in the theoretical literature, the main focus has been on empirical studies.
The empirical literature has mainly been occupied with the schooling decision,
merely viewing child labor as the lack of schooling. Chao and Alper (1998) analyze the
access to basic education in Ghana for children between 10-14 years of age. Two supply-
side factors that reduce participation are identified, namely (1) distance to primary school,
and  (2) pupil-teacher  ratio at  the primary level. Furthermore,  demand-side constraints
affecting enrollment and drop-out rates are access to drinking water and roads. Lastly,
household income, demand for child labor, and parental education are found to be key
factors in determining the likelihood of children attending primary school.
4More recently, the literature has moved to incorporate the work decision and thus
analyzing  schooling  and  child  labor jointly.  Nielsen  (1998)  analyzes child  labor  and
schooling in Zambia. A gender gap is established, as boys are found more likely to go to
school than girls. However, there does not seem to exist any gender related differences in
the working decision. Transport costs in the form of walking distance to school affects
schooling adversely. Furthermore, supply constraints on secondary schooling in the form
of distance are found to negatively affect the demand for primary schooling. This accords
with the view in Lavy (1996), who suggests that completion of primary schooling may
serve as a ticket to secondary schooling. Nielsen does not find a positive relation between
poverty  and  child  labor, and thus raises  doubts to the claim of poverty being  a  main
determinant of child labor, see, e.g., Grootaert and Kanbur (1995).
Canagarajah and Coulombe (1997) analyze 1991-92 data on child labor in Ghana
and find, similar to Nielsen, evidence of a gender gap in schooling, as boys have a higher
probability of attending school than girls. Again, there is no substantial differences in the
tendency to  work.  Including  expenditure  per  capita of  the household  as  a  proxy  for
welfare (or an "inverse" measure of poverty), a weak inversely u-shaped relationship with
child labor is established. This seems, in accordance with Nielsen's results, to contradict
the  traditional claim  of poverty being  a main  determinant of child  labor. However, a
strong positive  (negative)  relation  is found  between  wealth  (poverty)  and  schooling.
Livestock owned by the household is found to affect the working decision positively and
the  schooling  decision  negatively,  due  to  the  labor  intensity  of  livestock,  which
increasingly  finds  use  of  child  labor.  Lastly, monetary  costs  of  schooling  affect  the
schooling choice adversely.
Sasaki and Temesgen (1999), analyze child labor in Peru. In accordance with the
studies reviewed above, a gender gap related to schooling is established, i.e., females tend
to be  less likely to be  sent to  school. However, in addition to the  studies previously
reviewed, it is further found that girls are more likely to work than boys. Hence, the work
of girls may be  said to  somewhat subsidize the building up  of human  capital of their
brothers.  Furthermore,  a positive  relation  between mothers'  educational  level and  the
likelihood of the child attending school is established. Lastly, no  significant relationship
5between household income per capita and the schooling/work decision seems to exist for
this case, either.
While there  are differences in the various studies as reviewed above, there  are
some common points that stand out. Most convincingly, the existence of a gender gap in
schooling - girls tending to be less likely to attend school than boys - seems to be a fairly
well  established  result.  Further,  there  does  not  seem  to  be  consistent  evidence  of
discrimination in child labor. Lastly, the often hypothesized relationship between poverty
and child labor seems not to be well grounded in empirical studies. Together with other
issues of the previously reviewed research as discussed above, these are issues that will
be incorporated in this study.
3.  Presentation of the Data and Preliminary Analysis
In this section we present the data and perform a preliminary analysis of the incidence of
child labor and primary schooling in Ghana.
3.1  The Data
The data originates from the "Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire" (CWIQ) 1997 for
Ghana. The  CWIQ is  a household  survey, collected by  Ghana  Statistical Service  in
collaboration with the World Bank in  1997. It covers a total of 14,514 households and
60,686 individuals. Among the information covered is age and relationship of individuals
to the household head, the socioeconomic status of the household head, poverty quintile
of the household, whether the household is engaged in agriculture and/or raising cattle or
sheep, all of which are important factors in the analysis of child labor. To our knowledge,
this sample has not been applied previously to study the issue of child labor in Ghana.
3.2  Preliminary Analysis
A child is defined as a person less than 15 years of age. This coincides with the end of the
primary  school  age.  Likewise, we  define  that  the  cut-off  age  between  infancy  and
childhood is at the age of five. While, at least from a Western point of view, this may
seem extreme, Canagarajah and Coulombe (1997) report that "a child begins to work as
early as five years in rural Ghana".  Thus, at the outset the sample is Ghanaian youth
6between 5 and  14 (incl.) years of age. However, we will later have to modify the lower
bound to nine years due to econometric considerations.
The incidence of child labor and schooling across age is shown in table 3.1. The
figures for the full sample seem to indicate that child labor is not a substantial issue in
Ghana, since the vast majority attend school. However, when breaking the sample up by
age it is revealed that there is a substantial amount of harnful  child labor (defined as
child  labor directly conflicting with education, i.e. obtaining whenever the child works
only) taking place for the older children. This may reflect that earnings foregone raises
with age. As children grow older and their potential earnings increase, they are pulled out
of school.
Table  3.1  Incidence  of Child  Labor  and  Primary  Education  Across  Age
Age  School  Work  Both  Neither
5  99.0  0.0  0.4  0.0
6  98.7  0.1  0.3  0.9
7  98.0  0.5  0.5  1.0
8  98.3  0.5  0.3  0.9
9  97.2  1.2  0.4  1.3
10  96.6  1.7  0.3  1.4
1  1  95.3  2.7  0.4  1.7
12  95.3  2.5  0.5  1.8
13  93.2  3.2  0.5  3.1
14  87.0  5.9  0.3  6.8
Total  96.0  1.8  0.4  1.9
Source:  Core Welfare  Indicators  Questionnaire  1997  (Ghana).
Turning to the incidence of child labor and school attendance across rural/urban location,
table 3.2 reveals that the incidence of harmful child labor is more than twice as high in
rural areas than in urban (although still low), possibly reflecting the usage of children in
agriculture.
Tentatively investigating the incidence of child labor and school attendance across
gender, reveals the existence of gender related differences, see table 3.2. While boys are
more  likely to  attend  school,  girls are more  likely to  engage in  harmful  child  labor
activities.
The  second main  focus  of our  study,  investigating the  possible  link between
poverty and child labor, is initially touched upon in table 3.2, also. The table reveals a
7consistent pattern of children from poorer households 3 to be more likely to engage in
harmful,  i.e., human capital  inflicting,  child labor.  Similarly,  an almost similar pattern is
seen for school attendance,  in that children  from wealthier  households  are more likely to
attend school (even though the incidence  "jumps" a bit in the case of children from the
next-to-lowest  poverty  quintile).
Table 3.2  Incidence  of Child  Labor  and Primary  Education
School  only  Work  only  Both  Neither
Across  rural/urban  location
Rural  95.7  2.1  0.4  1.9
Urban  96.6  1.0  0.4  1.9
Across  gender
Girls  95.6  2.1  0.4  1.9
Boys  96.4  1.4  0.4  1.8
Across  poverty  quintile
Lowest  94.1  3.0  0.6  2.3
Next-to-lowest  96.0  1.9  0.3  1.8
Middle  95.3  1.8  0.3  2.7
Next-to-highest  96.9  1.2  0.4  1.6
Highest  97.7  0.9  0.4  1.1
A  crossfull sample
96.0  1.8  0.4  1.9
Source:  Core  Welfare  Indicators  Questionnaire  1997  (Ghana).
Based on these initial  results on the incidence  of child labor  and schooling,  we choose to
divide the sample  in two dimensions  in the econometric  analysis  in section  five. First, we
will only include  children 9-14  years of age (both included). 4 Nine years of age is chosen
as the lower cut-off  value, since at age nine the incidence  of harmful child labor for the
first time passes one percent. Second, the preliminary findings induce us to  focus
exclusively  on the work/no-work  decision,  since  almost all children  attend school.  Hence,
there is not much of a  schooling  "choice" to model. Also, including the schooling
"choice" would  bias the results  in the "no-harmful  child labor"  direction.
3Households  are weighted  according  to various  poverty  predictors,  e.g., how frequent  they get meat to eat,
whether  the household  uses toothpaste,  etc, and subsequently  divided  into  poverty  quintiles,  based on their
ranking- see Fofack  (1998)  for details.
4 This is because  that if not doing so, the results of the econometric  analysis of the next section would
become  biased  in the "no-harmful  child labor"  direction.
84.  Economic  Model  and Econometric  Methodology
In  this  section,  we  start  by  presenting  the  economic  model  underlying  the  analysis.
Following that is a discussion of econometric methodology of previous research and of
the methodology applied in this paper.
4.1.  Economic Model
The choice of child activities may be viewed as a joint decision: the household chooses
whether the child  should work, attend school, both, or neither. Formally, the economic
model is derived from the theory of household demand for schooling, in which education
is viewed as an investment in human capital. Households will thus choose to invest in
education of their children up to the point where the marginal benefit from an additional
year  of  schooling  equals  the  marginal  cost  of  an  additional  year  of  schooling;  see
Khandker,  Lavy  and  Filmer  (1994)  and  Mason  and  Khandker  (1997)  for  a  detailed
description of the model. The outcome of this decision - schooling, work, both or neither
- is determined by various individual, household and community characteristics,  giving
rise to the following simple model:
(4.1)  Si  S(Ii, Hi, C 1)
(4.2)  Wi =  W(I, Hi, C1)
where S and W are the decision variables (schooling or work of child i), I is a vector of
individual  characteristics (e.g. age and age squared, the latter to capture possible non-
linearities; whether the child is a child of the household-head or not, since we hypothesize
that children of the household-head would be less likely to work, relative to non-related
children), H is a vector of household characteristics (e.g., labor demand of the household,
proxied  by whether the household is engaged in agriculture, owns cattle and/or sheep;
wealth of the household, proxied by the socioeconomic status of the household and the
poverty quintile of the household), C is a vector of community variables  (whether the
household belongs to a rural or an urban community, the distance to nearest primary and
secondary school 5, the latter two which are exclusively supply factors, while the former
Supply constraints on secondary  education  may affect the demand for primary education, since
9also somewhat catches supply factors to the degree that schools are more dispersed in
rural  areas but, additionally, also catches possible regional differences in the "taste" or
propensity to engage in child labor activities). By this choice of explanatory variables, we
seek to control for as wide a spectrum of demand and supply factors -- which a priori may
be hypothesized to be affecting the household's  decision of child  labor activities  -- as
possible.
4.2  Econometric Methodology
As discussed in the previous section, previous research has focussed almost exclusively
on the schooling decision. With its almost exclusive focus on the schooling decision, this
literature - at least implicitly - merely views labor supply as the "inverse" of demand for
schooling.  However, it seems  more appropriate that the work  and  schooling decision
should be seen as two distinct, and, at the same time, joint decisions (while there may be
some truth in viewing child labor as the "flip side of the schooling coin", in the sense that
these  for practical  purposes are almost mutually exclusive usages of a  child's  time, it
seems  overly restrictive  that the determinants would have opposite effects - and of the
exact same size - which seems to be the implication from a strict "flip of the coin"-view).
Hence, recently the literature has moved into analyzing the school-work decision
as  a  joint  decision,  by  applying  either  (1)  a  bivariate  probit,  thus  simultaneously
estimating a probit for the schooling decision and one for the work decision in a SUR-
structure;  see,  e.g.,  Canagarajah and  Coulombe  (1997) and  Nielsen  (1998)),  or (2)  a
multinomial  logit for the four possible outcomes (school, no work), (school, work), (no
school, work), (no school, no work); see, e.g., Sasaki and Temesgen (1999) and Grootaert
(1998).  We will apply  a univariate  probit  model due  to the  considerations discussed
previously, hence  focussing on  the work decision  only, i.e. estimating  equation  (4.2)
above. Our dependent variable is the binary indicator variable:
[1  if child i works
0 otherwise
primary  school  may  be viewed  as a "ticket"  to secondary  education,  see Lavy  (1996).
10The indicator variable is  based on  responses to  the  question "What was
[NAME]'s main work status during the past 4 weeks".  If the main work status was labor
related activities rather than school, we interpret this as indicating that the child is
engaged in harmful child labor activities, i.e. child labor that directly  conflict with the
accumulation  of human  capital.
The determinants  of work is analyzed  in a standard  probit. Given the choice of
dependent  variable,  the estimated  parameters  and predicted  probabilities  from (4.1) will
then readily be interpretable  as impacts on harmful child labor, rather than merely on
child labor per se, harmful or non-harmful,  which had been the case had we chosen a
broader  definition  of child labor.
5.  The Determinants  of Child  Labor  in Ghana
This section  presents the empirical  findings  from the analysis  of determinants  of harmful
child labor in Ghana. In the first subsection  we estimate the probit model for the full
sample, as well as for various sub-samples  (across gender, urban/rural location and
highest/lowest  poverty quintile,  rural/urban  girls and boys and poor-/non-poor  girls and
boys), in order to highlight possible gender, location,  and poverty related differences.
Then follows a further analysis  of the possible link between child labor and gender and
poverty in the form of predicted  possibilities for the full sample, as well as for sub-
samples.
5.1 Estimation  of a Probit  Model  of Child  Labor  Determinants
The results from the full sample  as well as the various sub-samples  are presented  in the
table in Appendix  B. The table reveals  the presence  of a gender  gap in child labor  at the
aggregate  level, and girls are around four percent more likely to work than boys. When
we disaggregate  the sample  into various sub-samples,  this result appears  robust across  all
sub-samples.  This is consistent  with a conclusion  of discrimination  in favor of boys being
present in urban and rural areas as well as among  households  in the lowest and highest
poverty  quintiles. Hence,  we may conclude  the presence  of a poverty  related gender gap
in child labor in Ghana.
11It appears  that children from poor households  are more likely to engage in child
labor as they grow older. The intuition  behind  this result is that the value of the child's
labor increases  with age, thus leading  to an increased  likelihood  of working  over time.
A child of the household head is less likely to engage in harmful child labor
activities, thus confirming  our a priori hypothesis,  as discussed previously.  However,
children of poor households as well as rural boys and boys from poor households  are
found to be more likely to engage in harmful child labor than other children. This is
somewhat  puzzling, but may reflect that these groups have a higher demand for labor
(rural areas) and/or  do not have non-biologically  related  children living in the household
to substitute  for the labor of the household's  own children  (poor  households).
The socioeconomic  status of the household  head is an important  determinant  of
child labor. Children of self-employed  workers - from both  agriculture and  non-
agriculture  - are more likely to engage in harmful child labor activities for virtually all
(sub-) samples. This is also - though less consistently so - the case for children of
workers  from the informal  private sector.  Surprisingly,  children  of unemployed  or non-
active household  heads are only more prone to engage  in child labor for the poor, urban
boys and poor boys sub-samples.  However,  this may reflect  that it is more likely for the
household  head  to be unemployed  or non-active  for these groups.
Being disabled has an adverse  effect on child labor. One explanation  is that the
value of disabled childrens' marginal products would seem to be low, leading to the
household  not choosing  to use them for child labor  purposes,  and rather view them as a
human capital investment.  However, in urban areas disability may not be  affecting
productivity  quite as much as in rural areas (where the distances  and the types of labor
require mobility),  since  children in urban areas  may be serving  as vendors,  shoe cleaners,
etc., activities  which do not require  much physical  activity.  The result of an insignificant
parameter estimate is  consistent with this phenomenon, although one might have
expected  a statistically  significantly  positive  parameter  estimate.
Ownership  of land, sheep and cattle is an important  determinant  of child labor.
This points  towards the  importance of  these areas for usage of  childrens' time
(confirming  the results found by Canagarajah  and Coulombe (1997).6  This finding is
6  Unfortunately,  we do not have data to  investigate whether children engage in cooking and other
12further supported by the finding that children from rural communities  tend to have a
higher likelihood of  engaging in  child labor, except children from the wealthiest
households.
Poverty affects the likelihood  of engaging  in harmful child labor  positively  and is
a very robust finding  since it is found  to be statistically  significant  for the full sample as
well as all the sub-samples  (except  for urban girls). While the impact is somewhat  small,
the link is very clearly  existing in data. This confirms  our a priori beliefs, of a positive
link  between poverty  and  engagement in  harmful child  labor  activities,  while
contradicting  the findings of recent research, which typically  have found this link to be
absent  (see Canagarajah  and Coulombe  (1997)  and Nielsen  (1998)).
Supply factors affect child labor, especially  the distance to the nearest primary
school. Across most (sub-) samples,  there is a positive relation  between the distance to
nearest primary school and the likelihood  of engaging in child labor activities. Lavy
(1996) suggests that primary education serves as a "ticket" to secondary education.
Hence, if secondary education is rationed, there will be less of an incentive for the
household  to invest (in terms of direct costs to school uniforms,  books, etc., as well as
foregone  earnings)  in primary  education.  We find support  for this hypothesis,  since there
is a positive impact from the distance to the nearest secondary  school and engaging  in
harmful child labor activities. These results points towards the importance of supply
factors  as determinants  of harmful  child labor in Ghana.
Lastly, note that tests for the split of the sample across gender, rural-urban
location and  across poverty quintiles support a  split. 7 Hence, there are  structural
differences  between  the full sample  and the sub-groups.
housework,  which could be hypothesized  to engage  a substantial  amount  of child  labor.
7 Note that while  the results  from estimating  the model  for the three middle  quintiles  are not shown,  the log-
likelihoods  of these  are part  of the test.
135.2  Predictions  - Further  Analysis  of the Child  Labor-Poverty/Gender  Link
We now turn to predictions of the mean probability of being engaged in child labor for
the full sample --  as well as the sub-samples -- and across gender for the full sample as
well as each of the sub-samples in order to further identify the most vulnerable groups, as
related to harmnful  child labor.
The findings are presented in table 5.1. They confirm our earlier findings of rural
children being more likely than urban children (10.7 and 4.1 percent, respectively) and
girls more likely than boys (10.6 and 6.2 percent, respectively) and poor children more
likely than non-poor (16.2 and 2.5 percent, respectively, when controlling for individual,
household and community characteristics of the children. The gender gap is robust across
all sub-samples, rural girls work more than rural boys, urban girls work more than urban
boys, and poor and non-poor girls work more than poor and non-poor boys.8
Table 5.1  Predictions of Child Labor Across (Sub-) Samples (Percent)
All  Rural  Urban  Girls  Boys  Poor  Non-
Poor
Predicted Probability  8.5  10.7  4.1  10.6  6.2  16.2  2.5
(at the mean)
Observed Probability  12.1  15.0  5.3  13.6  10.7  20.2  5.3
Rural  Rural  Urban  Urban  Poor  Poor  Non-  Non-
Girls  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls  Boys  poor  poor
Girls  Boys
Predicted Probability  12.5  9.1  6.2  1.9  18.9  11.0  2.9  1.6
(at the mean)
Observed  Probability  16.5  13.8  7.6  2.9  21.6  19.0  7.5  3.3
Source:  Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire 1997 (Ghana).
In the preliminary data analysis, we found the incidence of child labor to increase
with age. In order to evaluate the estimated model, a natural next step, then, would be to
predict children's  activities over age. The findings from this exercise are presented in
table  5.2,  and  confirm  that  the  incidence of  child  labor  increase  with  age,  when
controlling for  individual, household and  community characteristics  of the  children.
However, again, this increase is most pronounced for girls, who - starting at more or less
the same level as boys at age nine - increases rapidly and almost double at age fourteen,
8 Note,  however, that  the model consistently under-predicts the incidence of child labor - this is a well-
known feature of the probit model, which predicts best, when the two outcomes are distributed fifty-fifty,
see Greene (1997).
14while  the  incidence  for  boys increase  with  less than  80 percent. The gender  gap  is
consistent  in  the  other  sub-samples, as  well,  girls  generally  work  more  than  boys.
Children from poor households are much more likely to engage in child labor activities
than children from non-poor households at all ages.
Table 5.2  Predicted  and  Observed  Incidence  of Child  Labor  Across  Age  (Percent)
Age/  9  10  11  12  13  14
(Sub-)  sample
All  5.9  7.8  6.6  9.9  8.7  10.6
(9.0)  (12.6)  (10.7)  (13.8)  (12.9)  (13.2)
Rural  7.5  11.3  10.2  11.6  9.6  13.5
(11.2)  (16.3)  (14.8)  (16.6)  (16.4)  (16.4)
Urban  2.1  1.9  0.5  5.5  5.6  5.1
(3.4)  (3.8)  (3.8)  (7.5)  (6.5)  (7.1)
Girls  6.4  9.1  7.9  13.6  11.7  12.0
(10.5)  (13.6)  (12.2)  (16.1)  (15.3)  (14.6)
Boys  5.0  1.6  4.4  1.9  5.2  8.1
(8.2)  (12.1)  (9.4)  (12.4)  (11.1)  (12.1)
Poor  12.5  - 11.0  18.0  14.8  13.2
(17.1)  (19.2)  (22.1)  (25.4)  (22.6)
Non-poor  1.4  0.0  0.0  1.3  1.1  5.7
(3.1)  (3.0)  (4.9)  (8.1)  (4.8)  (10.5)
Rural girls  7.3  12.6  5.9  14.9  14.4  14.4
(12.5)  (17.7)  (16.2)  (18.4)  (20.4)  (17.6)
Rural  boys  6.9  4.5  8.7  4.3  5.8  15.4
(10.2)  (15.6)  (13.5)  (15.6)  (13.6)  (17.8)
Urban  girls  3.6  2.9  1.7  9.8  7.5  7.3
(4.9)  (5.2)  (7.0)  (11.6)  (8.5)  (10.1)
Urban  boys  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  2.1  2.7
(2.8)  (3.3)  (1.9)  (4.6)  (4.8)  (3.8)
Poorgirls  16.9  20.1  11.9  17.3  18.6  13.9
(20.9)  (24.2)  (20.9)  (19.4)  (26.5)  (25.1)
Poor boys  8.9  9.3  9.4  13.1  11.6  11.2
(15.6)  (18.8)  (17.3)  (27.9)  (24.8)  (20.6)
Non-poor  girls  0.2  0.1  --  4.5  2.5  10.8
(3.4)  (3.1)  (14.4)  (7.6)  (15.7)
Non-poor  boys  0.3  2.1  0.2  0.0  --  2.1
(3.5)  (21.3)  (4.8)  (22.4)  (9.2)
Note: The number  in  parenthesis  is the observed  probability.
Source:  Core  Welfare  Indicators  Questionnaire  1997  (Ghana).
156.  Conclusion
This paper analyzes the incidence and determinants  of  harmful child labor
(defined as child labor that conflict with human capital accumulation  of the child) in
Ghana applying  a new data set, in an attempt  of identifying  the most vulnerable  groups,
thus possibly  enabling appropriate  actions  to be taken by policy makers.  While several
interesting  results are obtained,  the major conclusions  emerging  from this study are (1)
we reinstate  the positive relationship  between  poverty  and child labor, a conjecture  that
has been  questioned  by recent literature,  and  (2) we find evidence  of a gender  gap in child
labor linked to poverty,  since girls as a group as well as across urban, rural and poverty
sub-samples  consistently  are found to be more likely to engage in harmful child labor
than boys (3) there exist structural  differences  in the processes  underlying  harmful child
labor in Ghana across gender, across rural/urban  location as well as across poverty
quintiles of  households. The established gender gap  need not  necessarily imply
discrimination  but rather  reflect  cultural  normns.  A further  exploration  of this issue seems
to be a potentially  fruitful  avenue  for further  research.
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17Appendix A: Definition of Variables:
Dependent Variable:
Work:  1 if main occupation is work, zero otherwise
Explanatory Variables:
Individual characteristics:
Female:  1 if female, zero otherwise
Age:  Age
Age Squared:  Age squared
Child of HHhead:  1 if child of household head, zero otherwise
Disable:  1 if disabled, zero otherwise
Household characteristics:
Socio economic group of household head dummies: 1 if as stated below, zero otherwise:
("public or semi-public sector employee" is reference group)
Private Formal:  private sector employee (formal)
Private Informal:  private sector employees (informal)
Self-employed, Agr:  own account worker (agriculture)
Self-employed, Non-Agr:  own account worker (non agriculture)
Unemployed:  unemployed or non active
Other:  other or unknown
Owns land:  1 if household operates land, zero otherwise
Owns Cattle:  1 if household owns cattle, zero otherwise
Owns Sheep:  1 if household owns sheep, zero otherwise
Quintile:  household wealth quintile
(households are weighted according to various poverty predictors, e.g., how frequent they
get meat to eat, whether the household uses toothpaste, etc - see Fofack (1998) for
details).
Community characteristics:
Urban location:  1 if urban community (1984 population>5000)
Primary:  nearest primary school (minutes)
Secondary:  nearest secondary school (minutes)
18Appendix  B: Results From Estimation of Probit of Child Labor Determinants
All  Rural  Urban  Girls  Boys  Poor  Non-poor
Individual Characteristics:
Female  0.042  0.040  0.040  0.057  0.019
(0.006)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.018)  (0.007)
Age  0.056  0.076  0.027  0.084  0.023  0.209  0.008
(0.027)  (0.037)  (0.031)  (0.043)  (0.032)  (0.080)  (0.033)
Age squared  -0.002  -0.003  -0.001  -0.003  -0.001  -0.009  0.000
(0.001)  (0.002)  0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)
Child of  -0.0IS  0,007  -0.053  -0.050  0.018  0.062  -0.099
Household Head  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.008)  (0.018)  (0.018)
Disabled  -0.058  -0.071  0.002  -0.078  -0.041  -0.075
(0.016)  (0.022)  (0.045)  (0.026)  (0.015)  (0.060)
Household characteristics:
Socioeconomic Status of Household Head:
Private Formal Sector  0.043  -0.025  0.034  0.073  -0.004  0.009
Employee  (0.029)  (0.040)  (0.021)  (0.042)  (0.034)  (0.016)
Private Informal Sector  0.082  0.090  0.059  0.022  0.177  0.286  -0.004
Employee  (0.038)  (0.063)  (0.035)  (0.042)  (0.076)  (0.216)  (0.020)
Self-employed,  0.077  0.093  0.038  0.085  0.073  0.203  0.014
Agriculture  (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.017)  (0.057)  (0.011)
Self-employed, Non-  0.042  0.070  0.018  0.044  0.047  0.231  0.014
agriculture  (0.018)  (0.033)  (0.011)  (0.024)  (0.030)  (0.118)  (0.012)
Unemployed or Non-  0.019  0.020  0.013  0.002  0.048  0.223  -0.012
active  (0.020)  (0.034)  (0.015)  (0.025)  (0.036)  (0.124)  (0.013)
Other or Unknown  -0.027  0.062  -0.028
(0.051)  (0.121)  (0.072)
Owns Land  0.011  0.015  0.003  0.004  0.016  0.009  -0.005
(0.006)  (0.009)  (0.008)  0.010)  (0.008)  (0.019)  (0.007)
Owns Cattle  0.276  0.310  0.038  0.306  0.234  0.312  0.188
(0.021)  (0.023)  (0.029)  (0.032)  (0.027)  (0.048)  (0.047)
Owns Sheep  0.023  0.034  0.008  0.018  0.026  0.066  -0.002
(0.007)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.019)  (0.007)
Poverty Quintile  -0.026  -0.038  -0,004  -0.025  -0.026
(0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.003)
Community Characteristics:
Urban Location  -0.021  -0.007  -0.037  -0.127  0.007
(0.007)  (0.012)  (0.008)  (0 18)  (0.009)
Distance to Nearest:
Primary School  0.014  0.017  -0.003  0.016  0.010  0.026  0.009
(minutes)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.003)
Secondary School  0.008  0.016  0.001  0.010  0.006  0.006  0.005
(minutes)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.006)  (0.002)
Nunberof  11583  7754  3811  5615  5952  2441  2091
Observations
Pseudo R2 17.8  19.4  7.9  14.7  22.4  16.7  23.7
Log-Likelihood  -3503.1  -2645.5  -727.6  -1901.5  -1570.5  -1022.8  -327.4
Tests for Sample Split
9:  Split by:  Mann-Whitney Test  LR-test
Rural/Urban Location:  t  =  13.9  X2(15)  = 260.0
Gender:  t* =-5.1  %2(15)  =  62.2
Poverty Quintiles:  t* =-13.8  X2(60) = 234.4
9 For a description of these tests, see Appendix C.
19Rural  Rural  Urban  Urban  Poor  Poor  Non-poor  Non-poor
Girls  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls  Boys
Individual Characteristics:
Age  0.092  0.054  0.055  -0.016  0.076  0.282  0.049  -0.031
(0.058)  (0.048)  (0.053)  (0.030)  (0.119)  (0.120)  (0.047)  (0.035)
Age Squared  -0.003  -0.002  -0.002  0.001  -0.003  -0.012  -0.001  0.001
(0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.005)  90.002)  (0.002)
Child of  -0.016  0.027  -0.106  0.003  0.042  0.065  -0.153  -0.038
Household Head  (0.016)  (0.012)  (0.018)  (0.007)  (0.029)  (0.020)  (0.028)  (0.020)
Disabled  -0.098  -0.048  0.069  -0.094  -0.054
(0.028)  (0.028)  (0.134)  (0.108)  (0.044)
Household characteristics:
Socioeconomic Status of Household Head:
Private Formal  -0.012  -0.041  0.057  0.012  0.042  -0.010
Sector Employee  (0.065)  (0.047)  (0.035)  (0.026)  (0.036)  (0.011)
Private Informal  0.141  0.036  -0.037  0.187  0.898  0.022
Sector Employee  (0.090)  (0.088)  (0.020)  (0.092)  (0.020)  (0.041)
Self-employed,  0.108  0.083  0.044  0.045  0.164  0.700  0.037  0.003
Agriculture  (0.024)  (0.021)  (0.026)  (0.028)  (0.086)  (0.286)  (0.019)  (0.010)
Self-employed,  0.081  0.066  0.022  0.018  0.179  0.981  0.024  0.005
Non-agriculture  (0.048)  (0.049)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.141)  (0.031)  (0.019)  90.0120
Unemployed or  0.019  0.025  -0.006  0.051  0.144  0.966  0.035
Non-active  (0.050)  (0.048)  (0.019)  (0.035)  (0.143)  (0.033)  (0.037)
Other or  0.083
Unknown  (0.159)
Owns land  0.006  0.022  0.000  0.008  0.003  0.012  0.003  -0.010
(0.013)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.008)  (0.028)  (0.021)  (0.011)  (0.008)
Owns Cattle  0.340  0.283  0.030  0.041  0.337  0.250  0.194  0.154
(0.036)  (0.031)  (0.045)  (0.035)  (0.077)  (0.058)  (0.070)  (0.059)
Owns Sheep  0.031  0.036  -0.003  0.013  0.065  0.059  0.003  -0.003
(0.013)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.010)  (0.029)  (0.023)  (0.011)  90.007)
Poverty Quintile  -0.039  -0.037  -0.002  -0.007
(0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.002)
Community Characteristics:
Urban Location  -0.124  -0.113  0.038  -0.018
(0.028)  (0.023)  (0.018)  90.008)
Distance to Nearest:
Primary School  0.020  0.015  -0.002  -0.005  0.035  0.016  0.011  0.005
(minutes)  (0.004)  90.003)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.004)  90.003)
Secondary School  0.018  0.014  0.004  -0.001  0.010  0.002  0.006  0.003
(minutes)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.003)  (0.002)
Number of  3628  4120  1979  1823  1136  1300  974  1046
Observations
Pseudo R2 17.7  21.1  7.8  9.5  13.5  20.7  29.0  20.4
Log-Likelihood  -1338.4  -1302.9  -490.0  -214.4  -513.3  -501.8  -183.8  -121.0
Notes:  Bold: Statistically significant at  I percent; underline: Statistically significant at 5 percent; cursive:
Statistically significant at 10 percent; numbers in parentheses are robust Huber-White Sandwich standard
errors (see White; 1980).
Source: Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire 1997 (Ghana).
20Appendix C: Description of Tests For Split of Sample:
(i) Two-sample Wilcoxon  rank-sum/Mann-Whitney test:
This is a non-parametric test, i.e., it makes no distributional assumptions. It tests the
hypothesis that two independent samples (i.e., umnatched data) are from populations with
the same distribution using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, which is also known as the
Mann-Whitney two-sample statistic. Hence, the hypotheses are:
Ho: Distribution of child labor (group 1) = Distribution of child labor (group 2)
HA:  The distributions are not the same, i.e., split of sample is required.
(ii) Likelihood-Ratio Test.
Contrary to the ) Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum/Mann-Whitney test, this test is
parametric in the sense that it - in this context -- builds on the estimated log-likelihoods
from (several) probit models, which assumes normally, identically, independently
distributed error-terns. The test statistic is:
2 {abs[log-likelihoodfull  model  - loglikelihoodreduced  model]  I
and is distributed x2 with degrees of freedom given as the difference of the number of
parameters estimated in the full model (i.e., under HA)  and the number of parameters
estimated in the reduced model (i.e., under Ho). Hence, the hypotheses are:
Ho:  Split of sample is not required
HA: Split of sample is required
Notes:
For technical details of these tests, see, for example, Greene (2000).
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